Marketing communication plays a major role in influencing consumer purchases in new product categories. An important question about this communication is whether it plays an informative or a persuasive role over the life cycle of the new product category. We expect that consumer uncertainty about the attributes of brands in the new category is high in the early stages of the product life cycle and diminishes over time. The informative role of marketing communication is likely to reduce product uncertainty. Therefore, we conjecture that marketing communication plays a predominantly informative role initially and a predominantly persuasive role later.
Introduction
Marketing communication plays a major role in consumer adoption of new product categories.
Many of these new categories involve repeated purchases i.e., repeated decision-making on part of the consumer. In addition, some of these categories involve experience goods. In these cases, most of the product characteristics are intangibles that consumers are uncertain about before adoption and use. In addition to marketing communication, product experience also plays a significant role in influencing consumer preferences and behavior in such categories. Recent research has documented the change in preferences of consumer who are new to a product category (e.g., Heilman et al 2000) .
In this research, the behavioral process that underlies this change is usually not modeled explicitly.
On the other hand, extent research that models the evolution of preferences (typically as a learning process) has usually not considered product categories and products that are new to the consumer (e.g., Erdem and Keane 1996, Anand and Shachar 2001) . Finally, there is little research that documents the exact role of marketing communication in the evolution of preferences of consumers in categories that are new to these consumers.
In this paper, we propose to fill the gap between models that study new product categories without explicitly accounting for the behavioral process by which preferences evolve and models that account for this behavioral process but do not study new product categories. We use a dataset from an ethical drug category to conduct our empirical analysis. Ethical drugs are particularly suitable to study the role of marketing communication on evolution of preferences, as there is substantial variability in how patients respond to treatments. That is, there is uncertainty about the efficacy (where the effectiveness of the drug is to be weighed against the potential side effect of the drug) of a new drug prior to its use. In addition, the majority of marketing communication in this industry is targeted at the individual decision maker (Wittink 2002) . Finally, in the category we use (second-generation antihistamines), we have access to data on sales and marketing activity for all brand introductions from the inception of the category. These features of pharmaceutical categories in general and our data in particular make it an ideal category in which to carry out our analysis.
Specifically, we build a structural model of sales as a function of the evolution in consumer preferences that are in turn affected by marketing communication and product experience.
In pharmaceutical categories that involve ethical drugs, it is important to note the presence of multiple agents in the decision making process. While patients are the end-consumers of the likely that there is considerable uncertainty about its efficacy (an intangible characteristic). Hence, detailing is postulated to have an informative role in the introductory phase of the life cycle of the drug. Over time, as the physician's experience develops and the uncertainty about a drug's efficacy is substantially reduced, the informative role of detailing is likely to be very small and its persuasive role is likely to dominate. As mentioned earlier, we observe each drug in our data from introduction onwards for a fairly long time period. This allows us to study the different roles of detailing at different temporal stages in the life cycle of new drugs.
We conduct our empirical analysis on a category of ethical drugs. We define the category to include all second-generation antihistamines, which are drugs prescribed for allergies. As described in more detail in section 2.1, there are two distinct generations of antihistamines. The firstgeneration antihistamines, which have existed since the 1950s, come with severe lifestyle penalties (drowsiness, restrictions on driving and reduced effectiveness at work). The use of secondgeneration antihistamines avoids these penalties. As a result, the second-generation drugs are regularly prescribed for prolonged periods of time while first-generation drugs are usually prescribed only for short spells. Another major point of difference between the two generations of drugs is that the second-generation antihistamines are prescription drugs while most of the firstgeneration drugs are sold over the counter, without a physician's prescription. 4 Further, discussions with industry experts have revealed that second-generation antihistamines are almost never prescribed simultaneously with first-generation antihistamines. Thus, we believe that secondgeneration antihistamines constitute a distinct category of their own.
Our dataset consists of aggregate-level data on this category of second-generation antihistamines for the United States market. A unique feature of this dataset is that we observe marketing activities and physician prescription behavior from the time of introduction of the category. We also observe it for a relatively long period of time post introduction. These features of the data allow us to investigate the effects of marketing communication in the introductory as well as subsequent stages of the life-cycles of the brands in the category. It may be noted that individuallevel data with competitive marketing activity is hard to obtain in the pharmaceutical industry. Many previous studies that have used individual-level data have suffered from the limitation of not having 4 Claritin, the second-generation antihistamine drug with the largest market-share, has recently converted into an OTC drug. However, for the entire duration of our dataset, it was a prescription drug.
information on marketing activities of all the firms in the category, since such data are typically obtained from a single firm.
We develop a brand-level discrete-choice model of demand that explicitly allows for category expansion. In this model, we incorporate the influence of detailing on physicians' preference evolution via a Bayesian learning process. 5 We estimate the model using data from the secondgeneration antihistamines category. We focus our analysis on the effects of the informative and persuasive roles of detailing (while controlling for other promotional activities). We find that, on average, physicians are most sensitive to detailing relative to other promotional activities. However, more interestingly, we find evidence for both informative and persuasive effects of detailing on physicians' prescription behavior. In addition, we find that detailing plays a primarily informative role in the introductory phase (typically 9-18 months post introduction) but the persuasive role dominates later on. The finding that persuasive effects are significant may explain why firms continue to detail long after a drug is introduced.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we provide some background on prescription drug categories and the antihistamines category in particular. Section 3 describes the data. In section 4, we discuss the model. Section 5 has the empirical specification, our estimation methodology and identification arguments. Section 6 presents the results of our empirical analysis. We conclude and present directions for future research in Section 7.
Background

The Prescription Drugs Market
The prescription decision for ethical drugs involves multiple agents. While the end consumer is the patient, the decision-maker is usually the physician and there are often intermediaries like insurance firms, HMOs or government agencies, who pay in part for the prescription drugs. Thus, unlike most consumer goods categories, prescription drugs are not available to the end consumer for purchase unless a physician has prescribed the drug for a particular patient. Therefore, though it is possible 5 Early studies that used a Bayesian learning process to model category level diffusion include Stoneman (1981) and Jensen (1982) . Studies that have used Bayesian learning processes in other contexts include Meyer and Sathi (1985) , Roberts and Urban (1988) , Erdem and Keane (1996) , Crawford and Shum (2000) , Ching (2002) , Anand and Shachar (2001) and Ackerberg (2002) . Akçura, Gönül and Petrova (2002) billion dollars were spent on direct to consumer advertising. The study also notes that the ratio of expenditure on promotions directed towards physicians to that on direct to consumer advertising was higher in the years prior to 2000.
The primary source of promotion directed towards the physicians is in the form of detailing.
This activity refers to the calls made by representatives of the pharmaceutical firms (referred to as detailers) on physicians. In these calls, detailers talk to the physician about specific conditions, drug characteristics, results of clinical trials etc. They often carry with them brochures and other printed material, which may be left behind with the physician. During the course of the call, they may also leave behind other promotional material such as office items and drug samples.
Other marketing activities that pharmaceutical firms direct towards physicians include meetings and seminars, where experts for particular diseases or conditions are invited for talks, and advertising in medical journals. Relative to detailing, expenditure on these activities is relatively small. For instance, Wittink (2002) reported that of the about 8.5 billion dollars spent on promotions for 392 branded drugs directed at physicians in 2000, more than 6 billion dollars was spent on detailing. In our dataset for antihistamines, the total expenditure on these other marketing activities directed at physicians is only 13% of that on detailing.
The other main form of promotional expenditure in the pharmaceutical industry in general, and the antihistamines category in particular, is that on direct to consumer (henceforth referred to as DTC) advertising. This, as the name suggests, is primarily directed towards patients. There were severe restrictions on direct to consumer advertising in the past, but in 1997 the Food and Drug
Administration substantially relaxed the regulations on DTC advertising. This has led to a phenomenal growth in the expenditure on this activity (see Wittink 2002 , Neslin 2001 . For instance, in our dataset for antihistamines, the expenditure on DTC advertising as a proportion of that on detailing increased from 39% in the period 1993-1996 to 77% in 1997-2001 .
The price of drugs also plays a role, either directly or through intermediaries, in affecting the choice of the prescribed drug. In the case of patients covered by insurance, there are often differential co-payments for more expensive and less expensive drugs. For instance, insurance plans usually have a differential co-payment amount for branded and generic drugs (c.f. Artunian 2002).
In addition, HMOs often have preferred drugs on their formulary that they require physicians to prescribe unless an off-formulary drug is absolutely essential to prescribe. Whether a drug is on the formulary or not is usually based on lower negotiated prices. Uninsured patients pay for their own prescription drugs and thus are directly affected by the price of the drug.
6
Other evidence on the effects of marketing mix activities on pharmaceutical demand is provided by a large number of studies in the marketing, economics and medical literatures. Some early studies in marketing literature (e.g. Parsons and Vanden Abeele 1981, Lilien, Rao and Kalish 1981 ) used aggregate sales-territory level data to investigate the effects of sales force activity on sales. Leffler (1981) and Hurwitz and Caves (1988) use data from multiple categories of ethical drugs to investigate informative and persuasive roles of promotional activity. Rizzo (1999) also uses multicategory data to document the effect of advertising on price elasticities in pharmaceutical markets. Wosinska (2002) estimates the impact of detailing and DTC advertising in the anti-cholesterol category. Finally, there have been some recent studies that have investigated various aspects of pharmaceutical demand using panel data (Kamakura and Kossar 1998 , Gönül et al 2001 , Manchanda et al 2000 , Manchanda et al 2003 . These studies show that detailing has an effect on physicians' prescription behavior. However, as mentioned earlier, all these studies are agnostic about the mechanism by which marketing mix activities affect physician prescription behavior.
Allergies and Antihistamines
Allergies are reactions of the body to specific substances. There are two generations of antihistamines that are available to patients. First-generation antihistamines have been in use for a very long period of time and are available mostly over the counter, though they are sometimes also prescribed by physicians. 8 The main deleterious side effect with these drugs is that they are sedating, i.e. the patient feels drowsy after taking them. This is because histamines, while causing the symptoms of allergies, are also used in the part of the brain that keeps humans awake and alert. If histamines are blocked, this function of the brain is obstructed, causing the patient to feel drowsy. This places severe limitations on the quality of life of the patient, particularly when they have to be taken for prolonged periods of time. For instance, patients are advised not to drive after taking a dose of one of these drugs. In addition, patients' overall efficiency and effectiveness at work and home suffers as the drowsiness persists for a prolonged period of time.
The set of second-generation antihistamines that includes Loratadine (Claritin),Fexofenadine (Allegra), Cetirizine (Zyrtec) and the recently introduced Desloratadine (Clarinex), offers significantly better quality of life than the first-generation antihistamines. The main advantage of these drugs is that they are non-sedating. This allows them to be used for prolonged periods of time with no significant side effects. For example, patients are not restricted from driving after taking any of these drugs and there is no significant reduction in efficiency at work. In addition, the other side effects of the first-generation drugs like nausea and vomiting are also substantially reduced in the case of these newer drugs. Their efficacy at treating the condition itself is no lower than the older antihistamines. They are thus considered superior to the first-generation drugs in most respects and are safely prescribed for prolonged periods, often for the entire allergy season.
The first second-generation antihistamine to be approved was Loratadine, which was 
Data
The data used in this study is for the antihistamines market in the United States and was obtained from Scott Levin Inc., a firm that collects data on prescriptions written by physicians and marketing activities of pharmaceutical firms. Our data contains monthly observations from April 1993 to December 2001 for the entire United States antihistamines market. We use the data for the three main second-generation antihistamine brands (Claritin, Zyrtec and Allegra) in our study. Clarinex, which is the fourth antihistamine in the sub-category was introduced only in January 2002 and hence is not included in our analysis. There are thus 242 brand-month combinations for these brands that we use in our study.
A unique feature of this dataset is that we observe the category from its inception. This solves the starting value problem that is common in models of the kind we shall use. We also observe the data for a fairly long period of time and at monthly intervals instead of the usual quarterly interval. For each brand, we have information on the number of new prescriptions (no refills) -NRXs -written in that month, the average retail price for a prescription 9 and expenditure on detailing, DTC advertising and on other marketing activities such as meetings and events. 
Model
In this section, we discuss our model. We begin by motivating our model structure as a function of the nature of the research problem, industry practice and our assumptions. We then discuss the model specification.
Model Development
Prescription Decision
As described in Section 2, the prescription decision is a complex multi-agent process, involving the physician, the patient and possibly intermediaries like insurance firms and HMOs. However, the final decision is the physician's since the drug is dispensed only on the basis of the physician's prescription. Hence, we abstract away from this multi-agent process and make the assumption there is a single decision making unit, which we shall henceforth refer to as the physician.
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We assume that the physician values the health of the patient and her preferences maps into a utility function over the space of treatment options. This may be because of a sense of professional integrity and/or a desire to avoid malpractice suits in the future and to maintain her reputation. When the physician needs to make a decision on treatment for a patient, she is assumed to choose the option that gives her the highest utility. Based on our discussion with physicians, the drugs in this category are seen as substitutes and the use of multiple drugs to treat allergies is extremely rare. We therefore assume that the physician makes a discrete choice amongst available options, i.e. she chooses only one of the alternatives for a particular patient.
Further, we assume that drugs are bundles of characteristics and that the physicians have utility over those bundles of characteristics. Thus, they maximize Lanacasterian utility functions (Lancaster, 1971) . We assume that the set of primitive conditions hold such that the indirect utility function is linear in these characteristics. These characteristics are observed by the physician, but some of these may be observed with uncertainty. This reflects the fact that different patients respond differently to the same drug due to unobserved (by even the physician and/or patient) factors or to the fact that diagnosis cannot be perfect despite the best scientific techniques utilized.
Given that one or more of these characteristics are imperfectly observed by the physician before she makes a decision, she maximizes the expected utility of the alternatives at the decision stage.
Efficacy
In our case, we assume that all but one characteristic of the drugs are observed without any uncertainty by the physician. This characteristic is a scalar quantity that we refer to as efficacy. The underlying dimensions that comprise the efficacy of a drug are, among others, how well it treats the condition for which it is prescribed, the severity of the side effects that patients experience, the time it takes to treat the condition, and the post-treatment state of health of the patient.
There is variability across patients in the experienced efficacy for a particular drug. First, patients differ in their responses to the same treatment. This may be because of many unobservable factors inherent in the patient's body, for instance her immunity levels or other unobservables that are extraneous to the patient (e.g., the environment she lives in). Even with the best possible diagnosis process, the physician cannot say with certainty what the experienced efficacy would be for a particular patient. Second, there may be minor variations in the exact chemical composition of the drug between different batches because of inherent variability in the manufacturing process.
Even though these may be within the tolerances of the quality control system of the firm, there may be some differences in efficacy of different batches of drugs.
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Because of this variability, not all of which is known a priori to the physician, the physician is uncertain about the efficacy of a drug before he prescribes it to his patient. As a result, he is uncertain about the utility of prescribing a particular drug. Thus, as described earlier, the physician maximizes his expected utility when deciding which drug to prescribe. Physicians often get feedback from their patients after they have gone through the treatment course. We make the assumption that at this stage, the experienced efficacy of the drug for the patient is revealed perfectly. To summarize, efficacy is uncertain ex-ante, but is known with certainty ex-post.
Learning Process
Physicians are assumed to start with an initial prior belief about the efficacy of the drug when they first become aware of it. It is important to note that since they know that there is variability in how patients respond to the same treatment, this initial prior belief is also represented by a distribution.
At each time period, physicians draw from the public information set to update their prior beliefs about the efficacy of each drug in a Bayesian fashion. This public information set consists of the feedback received from patients who were prescribed the drug in the last period and information giving by pharmaceutical firms through detailing. As mentioned earlier, given our category, we focus on the information provided via detailing. 12 Thus, there are two sources of information that physicians use to learn about the efficacy of drugs -feedback and detailing. Following the signaling literature (e.g., Milgrom and Roberts 1986), we shall refer to these as feedback and detailing signals respectively.
We now list our assumptions regarding the learning process. First, given that we are not aware of any data source that informs us about the nature of patient feedback (e.g., proportion, frequency, timing), we assume that the number of feedback signals is equal to the number of prescriptions written in the last period. 13 Second, we also assume that the number of detailing signals 11 A similar argument is extended by Erdem and Keane (1996) and Ching (2002) to explain variability in quality. 12 Note that we shall control for (non-informational) effects of other marketing activities in our empirical specification. 13 This is not a problem as long as we are willing to assume that the ratio of feedback signals to prescriptions written remains fixed in every period. We choose to set this ratio to one i.e., the physician receives feedback once from all is actually the number of calls made in a period, even though our data contains the dollar spends on detailing in each period. 14 Third, the aggregate nature of our data (where we observe only the total amount spent on detailing by a firm for each time period) imposes the assumption that all physicians receive the same number of detailing signals. However, note that the signal content is allowed to differ across physicians. Fourth, the nature of our data also imposes the assumption that all signals (detailing and feedback) are received at the beginning of the temporal period of our data. That is, all the information in the details made in a particular period is available to the physician at the beginning of the period. The information in the feedback signals is available only at the end of that period. Finally, at each stage, we assume that the physician updates her beliefs about the efficacy of the drugs in a Bayesian manner, i.e., she has a set of prior beliefs based on the information set up to the previous period and she updates this with the information set of the current period to form a set of posterior beliefs. She then uses this set of posterior beliefs to take decisions in the current period.
This set of posterior beliefs forms the set of prior beliefs for the next period.
Heterogeneity
We assume that physicians may be heterogeneous in their responses to various linear characteristics in their utility function (e.g., price). This is likely to arise from the fact that each physician can potentially treat a different set of patients. 
Informative vs. Persuasive Roles of Advertising
As discussed earlier, we would like to focus on the informative and persuasive aspects of detailing. If detailing informs consumers about the existence of products or their observable characteristics (cf. Stigler 1961, Grossman and Shapiro 1984) or conveys information about their unobservable characteristics as in the case of experience goods (cf. Nelson 1974, Milgrom and Roberts 1986) , we can consider it to be informative. On the other hand, if detailing enters the physician's utility function directly and changes her tastes, we refer to it as persuasive (cf. Becker and Murphy 1993 for patients to whom she has prescribed the drug in the past. Also note that the future discussion on the relative information content of detailing and feedback signals is somewhat dependent on this assumption. 14 From our discussion with industry experts, it seems that the cost of a detail is very similar across the three firms in our data. Thus all we need to do is to assume a common scaling factor to go from dollars to number of calls. In our case, we set this scaling factor to one i.e., number of detailing signals is equal to the number of dollars spent on detailing. 15 If we consider the decision-making unit to be a physician, the distribution of the price coefficient represents the distribution of the mean price coefficient for the patients of different physicians. If the decision-making unit is the physician-patient combination, then the distribution of the price coefficient directly represents the distribution across this unit.
the theoretical explanation of why advertising could directly enter the utility function for a good). In the pharmaceutical category, the evidence on the role of detailing is mixed with some studies claiming a preponderance of persuasive effects and others that of informative effects and yet others suggesting that both these effects are present (see Leffler 1981 , Hurwitz and Caves 1988 , Berndt et al 1997 , Stern and Trajtenberg 1998 , Rizzo 1999 and Azoulay 2001 .
We postulate that both effects exist but that the dominant effect depends on the stage of evolution of the category. Specifically, if the category is in its introductory stage, informative effects dominate since uncertainty about drugs' efficacy is much higher in this phase. In later phases, as physicians' learn about efficacy from patient feedback, the informative effects become arbitrarily small and hence persuasive effects dominate.
In order to operationalize these two effects in our specification, we assume that the informative role of detailing affects the physician's preference for a given drug by affecting his preference for that drug in a Bayesian learning fashion. On the other hand, the persuasive role of detailing takes the form of a linear detailing goodwill stock in the utility function of the physician.
The goodwill stock for detailing follows the standard Nerlove & Arrow (1962) decay specification.
We now describe our specification.
Specification
Learning about efficacy
In this section we describe the learning process for an individual physician. Let I(t) denote the public information set at time t, j Q the true mean efficacy of drug j and Q the prior mean efficacy. We shall denote the physician's belief about the efficacy of drug j at time t by [ | ( )] At time t=0, the initial belief of the physician about the efficacy of drug j is assumed to be normally distributed. Further, for simplicity, we make the assumption that it is the same for all the drugs in the category i.e.
The i th feedback signal at time t for drug j is assumed to be a normally distributed 16 , given by
The i th detailing signal for drug j at time t is also assumed to be normally distributed since there is variation across individual physician-detailer interactions. The signal is given by
Thus, the detailing and feedback signals are assumed to be distributed normally around the true mean efficacy. The implicit assumption is that both these signals are truthful, i.e. they are equal to the true mean efficacy of the drug in expectation. The variances in equations (1) 
where 
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It is worth remembering our assumption that all detailing signals are received at the beginning of the period and that all feedback signals are received at the end of the period. Thus, the physician updates her prior belief with feedback from prescriptions written in the last period and from detailing in the current period.
By the standard property of the mean of i.i.d. normal distributions,
2 ( 1) ( 1) 1
Thus,
( 1 
The variance of the posterior belief is given by 
By recursively applying (13), we get 
It is important to note that while the physician knows her belief (i.e. the distribution of efficacy) with certainty at each time period, the econometrician does not observe it. This is because while the physician observes the realizations of the detailing and efficacy signals in the information set, the econometrician does not.
Utility Function and Share Expression
Physician p's utility of prescribing drug j to patient i at time t is given by the Lancasterian utility function of the form given below
where X jt is a (1 x K) vector of observed characteristics for drug j, that include price, season dummy and goodwill stocks for detailing, dtc advertising and other marketing expenditure.
We shall describe how these goodwill stocks are constructed shortly 
where the expectation is over the efficacy distribution.
17 Other researchers, notably Erdem and Keane (1996) and Ching (2002) , have used a utility function that is non-linear in the efficacy term in order to account for risk aversion or risk seeking behavior. This becomes particularly important when one looks at dynamic choice behavior. Since that is not our primary interest, we consider the more simple case of risk neutrality, i.e. efficacy entering the utility function linearly.
where pjt Q is defined in equation (5).
And let the utility of the outside good (i.e. other treatment options) be given as
Note that the presence of the outside good allows for category expansion, i.e., the total sales of second-generation antihistamines are allowed to vary (increase or decrease) over time.
We assume that the pjt ε terms are i. 
where J is the total number of brands.
The aggregate share is thus obtained by integrating this probability over the physicians i.e., ( )
where ψ is the joint distribution of physician characteristics, which include the mean efficacy terms and the coefficients for observed characteristics. θ is a vector of parameters for this joint distribution ψ , which includes the variance of the prior belief, the variances of the detailing and feedback signals and the heterogeneity variances.
We note here that the set of physician-specific mean efficacy ( pjt Q ) for the J brands is observed by the physician but not by the econometrician. Further, this random variable is serially correlated, as the draw in period t depends on the draw in period (t-1). This is clear if we look at the expression for pjt Q in equation (9). Also, the coefficients p β are observed by the physician but unobserved by the econometrician.
jt
X is a vector of observed attributes of the brand. In our empirical analysis of the antihistamines category, we include goodwill stock variables for detailing, DTC advertising (DTC) and meetings and events expenditure (OME) in addition to price and a dummy for the peak allergy season in jt X . The goodwill stocks are of the standard Nerlove-Arrow (1962) form We construct goodwill stocks for DTC advertising and OME in a similar fashion. The reason for using goodwill stock is to account for carryover effects in these variables, which may be potentially important. Thus, by entering the detailing stock in the linear specification, we allow for its persuasive effect on prescription behavior. We have already accounted for its informative role in the learning process. By estimating these two effects separately, we can empirically distinguish these two effects.
We include a dummy for the peak seasons for allergies in our specification. As described earlier, many allergies are seasonal and there are two allergy seasons. The spring season for many allergies runs from March through June and the autumn allergy season runs from September to
October. The seasonal variations are clear from Table 1 , which shows the substantial difference between mean NRXs in the months that constitute the allergy season and in other months.
jt ξ is an iid unobserved characteristic that is common across physicians but varies by brand and time. It is important to note that it is unobserved by the researcher but observed by the physician. It could include the effect of marketing activities by pharmaceutical firms that we do not observe, for instance, advertising in medical journals.
Estimation
Estimation Strategy
Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995) (henceforth BLP) have developed a GMM based methodology that allows for the estimation of such random coefficient discrete choice models where prices may be endogenous. This is accomplished by transforming this non-linear problem into a linear problem as suggested in Berry (1994) . Then standard IV methods can be used for consistent estimation. This methodology is also described in detail in Nevo (2000) . However, in our setup, this methodology cannot be directly used. This is because we have the vector of serially correlated efficacy terms in the model, which are themselves functions of the parameters of the model.
Therefore, we develop a modification of the standard BLP methodology to estimate our model. This is described in detail in Appendix 1. 
Identification
In this section, we lay out the identification arguments for the model parameters (for a detailed discussion of identification issues for this class of models, see Ching 2002) . 19 The identification of the linear parameters ( p β ), given the set of non-linear parameters is straightforward. As in all BLPlike models, this requires the assumption of exogeneity of the time of entry of drugs. This is quite reasonable given the institutional feature in this market wherein drugs can enter only after approval from the FDA.
In order to understand how the learning parameters are identified, we shall first note that the mean efficacy jt Q (which is constructed from the primitive learning parameters) is identified from the evolution of shares. In the steady state, when most of the learning has already taken place, 18 We should also mention that it is possible to estimate models of this class using likelihood-based approaches (e.g., Ching 2002 , Mukherjee 2002 . Both methods have their advantages and disadvantages. For example, the GMM-based methodology used here does not require specific parametric form assumptions on the unobserved characteristics. Further, estimation does not require the assumption of sampling errors on the share expression to form the likelihood function. On the other hand, likelihood-based models are efficient if the parametric assumptions are accurate. 19 We also carried out a simulation study to test the identification of the parameters. We were able to recover the model parameters quite well. Details on this study are available from the authors on request. Finally, the substitution patterns that do not correspond to IIA behavior identify the distribution of heterogeneity (the elements of the Σ matrix) for the linear parameters.
Estimation Issues
There might be a concern about endogeneity of prices. In order to ensure that estimates are not biased, we use a methodology that allows for the use of instrumental variables. A valid instrument would be correlated with prices but uncorrelated with the unobserved product attribute. We use Purchaser Price Indices (PPIs) for antihistamines as instruments in our study. This data is publicly available at the Bureau of Labor Statistics. We use PPIs for upto 6 lagged periods and interact them with brand dummies to construct our instrument matrix. The exogenous variables are also included in this instrument matrix.
Since our specification accounts for the no-prescription option in the form of the outside good (this is necessary to account for overall category expansion), we need to specify the size of the potential market. For this purpose, we use the number of allergy sufferers in the United States as the potential market for these antihistamines. The most reliable estimate of the number of allergy patients is from a study by the American Academy of Allergy, Asthma and Immunology (AAAAI) and referred to by the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, which is a part of the National Institutes of Health. This study gives a number of 50 million allergy patients, which we use to construct shares of the potential market for the three brands.
We specify heterogeneity only on the price coefficient. In principle one could specify a diagonal variance-covariance matrix for heterogeneity on all coefficients or even a full variancecovariance matrix. However, with our dataset, this would lead to an unacceptably high dimensionality, as we have a total of 242 observations across brands and time. Hence, we restrict ourselves to this limited notion of heterogeneity. Note that heterogeneity, per se, is not very important to our analysis as our primary interest is in the learning process and not in accounting for flexible substitution patterns.
For the purpose of simulation, we use 100 draws for the heterogeneity parameters and 100 set of stacked draws for the serially correlated efficacy-related signals. For each of these draws, the entire efficacy vector is computed. The predicted share is then obtained by a Monte Carlo integration of the individual probabilities for these 100 draws.
As noted earlier, we need to fix the value of the variance of the initial prior belief of efficacy to 1. Further, based on preliminary analyses, we found that the best carryover parameter for the stock variables was 70%. This is similar to the carryover parameters reported in previous studies (cf. Narayanan, Desiraju & Chintagunta 2002; Berndt et. al. 1994) . This is also consistent with the industry belief that the effect of these expenditures lasts for about 6 months. A carryover of 70% implies that the effect of expenditure on a marketing activity is diminished by about 90% in 6 months. We also reparametrize the detailing and feedback signal variance parameters by exponentiating them in our estimation to ensure that they are positive. In our parameter estimates, we thus report the natural logarithms of the respective parameters. Finally, we use a Nelder-Mead Simplex method based minimizer to obtain our estimates and use numerical gradients to obtain the standard errors of our estimates.
Results
Parameter Estimates and Elasticities
The parameter estimates from our model are reported in Table 2 . As can be seen from the table, the estimates are mostly significant and have the expected signs. We now describe some of the key results. Recall that the main parameters of interest are the variance of the detailing and feedback signals and the linear parameters, i.e. the coefficients of price and goodwill stocks for DTC advertising, detailing and meetings and events.
The first four parameters in Table 2 are the true mean efficacies for the three brands and the prior mean efficacy respectively. The parameter estimates indicate that the highest efficacy perception is for Claritin, followed by Allegra and Zyrtec. This is consistent with the context as Claritin is the oldest brand in the category and has the highest share. The mean efficacy levels for all three brands are higher than the prior mean efficacy. This implies that there is learning over time.
Interestingly, our results show that Allegra has a higher true mean efficacy level than Zyrtec even though it was introduced later. This is consistent with the data -the share buildup for Allegra is faster than that for Zyrtec and by the end of the data series, Allegra has a higher share than Zyrtec.
The variance parameters are positive and significant indicating that there is significant learning occurring through both detailing and feedback from past prescriptions. Recall that these parameters are relative to the initial prior variance, which is set to one. Hence their absolute values do not have any meaning. However, the ratio of the two effects is of interest as it informs us of the relative contribution to learning by these two information sources. Note also that in order to keep these parameters positive, we have reparametrized them as exponents. Hence, the parameter values in Table 2 have to be exponentiated before we take their ratios. the cost of a detailing call, we can conclude that a single detailing call is 100/1.90 = 52.63 times more informative than feedback from a past prescription.
Another way to look at this comparison is to compute the marginal effects of these two sources of information on prescriptions written. In Table 3 We now discuss the linear parameters ( Table 2 ). The price coefficient is negative and significant as expected. The coefficients for the goodwill stocks for detailing, DTC advertising and OME are all positive and significant. The coefficient for the season dummy is also positive and significant. The parameter on heterogeneity in price coefficient is, however, not significant. We conjecture that it is hard to identify heterogeneity in our dataset since there are only three brands and relatively few observations. As mentioned earlier, heterogeneity is identified in such models through the observed substitution patterns. With only three brands between which substitution can take place, the heterogeneity parameter becomes difficult to identify in the data. Note that an alternative specification without the heterogeneity parameter did not affect the results substantially in terms of significance and direction.
The elasticities for price, DTC advertising, other marketing expenses and detailing are reported in tables 4 through 7. While there are analytical expressions for elasticities of price, DTC advertising and OME, the detailing elasticity needs to be computed by simulating changes in shares with small changes in the detailing expenditure in a particular month. This is because detailing affects share in two ways -by affecting learning and directly through the linear effect on utility. The elasticity estimates indicate that demand is most elastic to detailing, followed by OME and DTC advertising in that order. The relative ordering of elasticities is in line with prior research (e.g., Neslin (2001) and Wittink (2002) report higher effect of detailing than of DTC advertising and OME in their studies across several pharmaceutical categories). In the anti-cholesterol category, Wosinska (2002) also finds that the marginal effect of detailing is higher than that of DTC advertising.
The main result of interest in this study is the distinction between the informative and persuasive roles of detailing. We find that both the learning variance parameter and the coefficient for the linear detailing goodwill stock are positive and significant. This suggests that both informative and persuasive roles of detailing are present in this category. We compute the partial effects due to the informative and persuasive effects of detailing. We do this by varying only the number of detailing signals or only the detailing stock respectively while keeping the other fixed in our elasticity computations. It may be noted that the total elasticity of detailing is then just the sum of these partial elasticities.
The informative and persuasive elasticities of detailing are reported in Tables 8 and 9 respectively. These numbers seem to suggest that, on average, the persuasive effect is much higher than the informative effect. However, these averages do not account for the fact that the informative effect decreases over time, as the physician's belief about the mean efficacy asymptotes to the true mean efficacy of the drug. The persuasive effect does not have this feature and varies only with the levels of detailing and the shares, thus staying within a relatively narrow band. Figure 1 shows plots of informative and persuasive partial elasticities of detailing over time for the three brands. These plots suggest that the informative effect becomes negligible by the end of the data series. It takes between eleven and sixteen months for this effect to fall below 10% of its peak level. In other words, the learning effect due to detailing is above 10% of its peak value for the first one to two years, depending on the brand. Across brands, the drop to 10% of peak values is fastest for Zyrtec (eleven months) while it takes sixteen months for the other two brands. Thus, most of the learning from detailing occurs in this introductory phase of the brand's life cycle.
As mentioned earlier, we conjecture that the informative effect of detailing dominates in the introductory period for the brand, but that the persuasive effect dominates later on. In order to check this, we plot the informative and persuasive effects as proportions of total elasticities of detailing for the three brands (Figure 2 ). The plots suggest that the informative effects dominate for the first few months after introduction of the brand and in subsequent months, the persuasive effects dominate. The informative effects dominate for 18 months after introduction for Allegra, 16 months after introduction for Claritin and 9 months after introduction for Zyrtec. These brandlevel differences on how long the informative effects dominate are related to the patterns of detailing of these brands. In the first nine months after introduction, the detailing for Zyrtec was 139% of the average for the entire data. For Claritin, detailing in the first nine months was at 99%
of the overall average, and for Allegra, it was at 70% of the overall average. Hence, this initial burst of detailing for Zyrtec causes much faster learning through detailing. As a result, the informative effect asymptotes towards zero much more rapidly in the case of Zyrtec than for the other two brands.
In sum, our results highlight an important aspect of the effect of marketing communication, that has not been explicitly studied in prior research. We find evidence in support of our postulate that informative effects dominate in the initial phase of the brand's life cycle and persuasive effects dominate later on. Previous studies have often looked at mature product categories and have therefore been unable to use data from the introduction of the category. Further, they do not explicitly account for both informative and persuasive effects simultaneously occurring in new product categories. Thus, our finding about the dominance of the informative and persuasive effects in different stages of the product life cycle is an important contribution to the literature on marketing communication.
Managerial Implications
From a managerial perspective, the important issue is the long-run effect of detailing and the consequent implications on allocation of detailing dollars over the life cycle of the drug. The longrun effect of detailing on physician prescriptions arises from three sources. First, higher levels of detailing cause faster learning about drug efficacy. This causes more prescriptions to be written in future periods. We shall refer to this as the primary informative effect of detailing. Second, higher levels of detailing also affect future goodwill stock of detailing, again causing an increase in the number of prescriptions written. We shall refer to this as the primary persuasive effect of detailing. Finally, there is also an indirect effect of detailing that arises from the number of prescriptions written. As the number of prescriptions written (both in the current and future periods) increases, the resulting increase in feedback signals causes a further increase in the rate of learning. We shall refer to this effect as the secondary informative effect. Note that the secondary informative effects only come into play when we consider long-run effects since feedback signals only affect learning for subsequent periods.
We compute long-run elasticities of detailing on physician prescriptions, taking into account these three effects. We report the average monthly long-run elasticities of detailing in Table 10 , computed by first evaluating elasticities for the current and eleven subsequent months and then converting these into monthly averages. These long-run elasticities are substantially higher than short-run elasticities, indicating that detailing effects persist over a reasonable period of time. 21 We then decompose these long-run elasticities into the three component effects -the primary informative effect, the primary persuasive effect and the secondary informative effect. We compute the changes in prescriptions for the current and eleven subsequent months for each of these components by varying only the respective component and simulating the new prescriptions. The percentage contributions of these partial elasticities to the total elasticities are reported in Table 11 .
An inspection of the table shows that the relative strength of the three effects varies across the brands. The primary persuasive effect dominates for Claritin and Zyrtec, while the primary informative effect dominates for Allegra. These differences arise because the brands are introduced at different points of time and have different share and detailing patterns over time. For instance, Allegra, the last brand to be introduced, has much greater informative effects at the end of the data series than Claritin, whose informative effects have reduced to negligible levels. This is reflected in the higher average contribution of informative effects (primary as well as secondary) for Allegra than for Claritin. The secondary informative effects are relatively small for the three brands.
As in the case of short-run elasticities, we expect to see differences in long-run effects depending on whether the brand is in the introductory stage of its life-cycle or in later stages. In the introductory stages, where there is greater uncertainty about the brand's efficacy, the informative effects will have a greater contribution to total effects than the persuasive effects and this will be true in the long-run as well. As shown earlier, the short-run informative elasticities dominate for nine to eighteen months after introduction. We therefore compute the average contributions for the first nine months after introduction. These numbers are reported in Table 12 . As expected, the primary informative effects dominate in this introductory phase. In Table 13 , we report the contributions due to the three effects in the last nine months of the data series. In this period, the contributions of persuasive effects are much higher than in the introductory phase.
Our findings on the variation of the detailing elasticities over time suggest that that it may be beneficial for firms to allocate more resources to detailing in the early introductory phase, when both informative and persuasive effects are present, than in later periods, when only the persuasive effects are present. In other words, firms are better off if they spend more on detailing in the introductory period, as it leads to faster learning. However, they need still need to detail in later periods as persuasive effects affect prescriptions as well.
We therefore examine the actual detailing patterns for the three brands over time (Figure 3 ).
The figure shows the total detailing expenditure for three blocks of twenty months each, starting from the month of introduction. Recall that the first block is approximately the period when informative effects dominate. In the second block, the persuasive effects are larger than the informative effects. In the final block, the informative effects are almost negligible. Figure 3 shows distinct temporal patterns of detailing expenditure for the three brands. Interestingly, only Zyrtec shows a pattern similar to our expectation (high detailing in the introductory period followed by lower detailing). Allegra has low detailing in the introductory block of months relative to later periods while Claritin exhibits (approximately) constant detailing expenditure over the three blocks.
As Allegra and Claritin detailing does not follow the pattern suggested by our results, 22 we conduct counterfactual "experiments" to assess the revenue impact if they had followed the suggested pattern. Specifically, we investigate how revenues for the first sixty months after introduction would change for Claritin and Allegra if their detailing expenditure was high initially and lower in subsequent months. We reallocate the actual total Allegra and Claritin detailing expenditure across the three time blocks (of 20 months each) in the same proportion as the actual Zyrtec allocation across these blocks. We vary the detailing of one brand at a time and compute the new predicted shares, keeping everything else (including other brands' detailing expenditure) fixed at actual levels.
Our results indicate that, relative to actual total revenues, Allegra's total revenues in the first sixty months would go up by 16.88% and those of Claritin by 4.41% if they were to allocate their 22 Note that these patterns may be the outcome of unobserved reasons such as institutional practices.
detailing expenditure across these months the same pattern as for Zyrtec. These findings suggest that Allegra and Claritin could potentially have increased revenues if they had followed the temporal detailing allocation indicated by our results.
Model Comparison
We compare our model to three alternative models in order to assess its predictive performance.
The first alternative model that we estimate is a random coefficients logit model with the same linear parameters as in our model (i.e., goodwill stocks for detailing, DTC and OME, prices and a season dummy) and brand specific intercept terms. In the next alternative model, we add a log(time) trend in the specification. Log(time) is used to account for the concave growth pattern of shares and provides a reduced-form proxy for the learning process.
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Finally, we estimate a model with log(time) trend as well as cumulative past prescriptions, to account for some persistence effects. We estimate these models and our model for the first 102 out of the 105 months in our dataset, keeping the last three months as holdout. We compute the mean absolute percent deviation both for the data in sample and for the holdout sample. These statistics are given in Table 14 . As can be seen from the table, the in-sample as well as out-of-sample prediction for our model is better than that for any of the alternative models. As expected, the model prediction improves for these alternative models as additional variables are added. However, overall, our model performs better than the alternative models.
Conclusions
In this paper, we develop a structural model that allows us to describe the role of marketing communication in influencing the evolution of preferences in new product categories. An important contribution of this paper is that it bridges the gap that exists in the literature between models for new product categories that are non-structural with respect to the process of diffusion and models that are structural but do not study new product categories. From a methodological viewpoint, our model does not require parametric assumptions on the unobserved attribute and 23 Instead of log(time), we also experimented with linear and quadratic time trends. Since log(time) fit the data the best, we retained it in the specification on the alternative models.
allows for endogeneity of prices. 24 We have also presented an empirical application of this model to the second-generation antihistamines category. We have specifically investigated the issue of whether detailing plays an informative or a persuasive role and how these roles evolve over time.
By using a unique dataset that contains observations from the introduction of the category, we are able to estimate significant and as well as substantial (in magnitude) learning effects due to product experience and promotional activities. We find that a single detailing call is between 31 and 52 times as informative as a single feedback from a patient in terms of learning about the efficacy of drugs. This would in part explain why pharmaceutical firms spend such large amounts of money on detailing. It would also suggest that detailing has important positive welfare effects, since doctors learn about efficacy of drugs faster if they are exposed to detailing.
We have found evidence for both informative and persuasive effects of detailing. This finding is significant because most prior research has found primarily one effect, but without consensus between studies on which one that was. It is possible that studies that found primarily persuasive effects did so because they used data for mature brands in their empirical analysis. It is natural to expect that informative effects would be much smaller for mature brands than for new brands. In terms of resource allocation for detailing over time, our results suggest that firms should follow a pattern of heavier detailing at the introduction phase followed by lower levels.
Our study reinforces findings in prior research that the detailing elasticities are much higher 25 We do not expect to find forgetting in our data as ethical drugs are a high-involvement product category. In addition, in our chosen category, there are only three brands that are regularly prescribed in very large numbers.
In finding the predicted share, we need to integrate out the distributions of efficacy and heterogeneity. Since this integration is not analytically tractable, we do this by simulation using the method described by Pakes and Pollard (1989) . We generate a set of draws for this distribution, taking into account the serially correlated nature of the efficacy distributions. We then find the simulation equivalent of the predicted share by doing a Monte-Carlo integration over these draws.
We note that the expression for jt δ in equation (A.5) is linear in the price coefficient. Thus, we can use standard instrumental variables methods to consistently estimate the parameters that enter this linear expression. However, this is not directly possible yet, since the efficacy term also enters this linear expression.
We note that given a set of guesses for the primitive learning parameters 6. Compute the residuals of the above regression and find the GMM criterion function. 7. Repeat steps 2 to 7 and find the vector of learning and heterogeneity parameters that minimize this criterion function. 1 Only the informative effect of detailing was considered when computing the marginal effect of detailing i.e., the persuasive effect through the goodwill stock of detailing was not considered 1 For each month, the percentage change in NRXs for the current period and 11 subsequent months due to each percentage change in current detailing expenditure was evaluated. This annual figure was then converted into a monthly average. This average is reported in order to make it comparable to short-run elasticity estimates reported earlier, which are for the current month only. Note: It may be noted that the three brands are at different stages in their brand life-cycles in the last nine months of the data series, since the three brands were introduced at different times. Specifically, Claritin was introduced the earliest and by the end of the data series, its informative effect has reduced by a much greater extent than for the other brands. Note: The learning model was estimated again, keeping the last three months data as a holdout sample. The other models were similarly estimated using the same three months data as the holdout sample. 
